In Romania, as in many Central and Eastern Europe countries, during the communist regime all the banks were owned by the state and their activities were circumscribed by rigid norms. After the communist regime had fallen, the state owned banks had to adapt to a competitive environment. The management inefficiency, the political interests and the corruption led some of these banks to critical situations. Such circumstances convinced Romanian authorities to privatize the banks owned by state. From the seven state-owned banks that activated in the 1990s in Romania, one had to be closed, four were privatized and two are still in the state propriety. In this paper we approach some turning points in the evolutions of these banks. We also try to configure the future of the remained state-owned banks.
Introduction
The dispute over the optimal ownership structure of banks is one of the main dimensions of the controversy about the role that the state should play in the financial sector. In this debate various arguments were brought in favor or against the stateowned banks (SOBs). The so-called development view considers that SOBs are more suitable than the private banks to finance the economic growth in developing countries (Gerschenkron, 1962; Andrianova et al, 2002) . It claims that SOBs are suitable especially to support the development in rural and isolated areas where the private banks could hesitate to open branches (Burgess and Pande, 2003) . This view is in the line with some development theories that consider that the government should own the firms from the strategic economic sectors (Lewis, 1950; Myrdal, 1968) . Other arguments in favor of the presence of SOBs were provided by the socalled social view which assigns to the public sector the role of correcting the markets imperfections (Stiglitz, 1994) . A related view justifies the state ownership of banks by considering that some banking services have a public-good nature (Corrigan, 1982) .
In opposition with the development and social views, the political view over government's involvement in the banking system considers that the SOBs are created and maintained by politicians as tools to reward their supporters (LaPorta et al., 2002; Sapienza, 2004 ). This view is in line with theories that criticize the government ownership of enterprises as promoting incompetence and corruption (Shleifer, A. 1998; Megginson, 2004) . In case of SOBs, the political influence could affect the economic considerations of the credit allocation (Kane, 1977) . As a result, SOBs had a significant presence among the incipient forms of capitalist institutions. Megginson (2003) revealed that until 1980s, in countries with French civil law commercial codes the state ownership of banks was generally higher than those with German law, Scandinavian law or English common law codes. In the communist system introduced in the Soviet Union, banks served as instruments of control and funds allocation. The few banks allowed to activate functioned, in fact, as departments of a single bank (Sherif et al., 2003) . After the World War II, such financial systems were imposed in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries which had fallen under the Soviet Union domination. The economic reforms initiated in Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev, known as perestroika, had a major impact on CEE countries. There were some notable attempts to reform the banking system by offering more autonomy to banks. In Hungary, in 1987, it was implemented a two-tier banking system.
Since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when the neo-liberal policies started to be implemented, significant programs of SOBs privatization were launched in most of the developed countries and in many developing countries. In 1990s, after the fall of communist regimes, CEE countries joined to this trend.
The dispute between SOBs and private banks, which seemed to be won by the last ones, was reignited by the recent global crisis. In present, the banking sector problems are perceived by the public opinion as one of the main factors which caused and aggravated the global crisis. It is admitted that large profits temptations made banks offer substantial loans with high risks. When the financial crisis erupted, many governments had to rescue, by enormous bailouts, the banks in difficulty which were considered "Too Big to Fail" or "Too Interconnected to Fail" or "Too Systematically Connected to Fail" (Molyneux et al., 2011). However, for the ordinary taxpayers it was not very easy to understand why public funds were spent for saving the rich bankers while the poor employees of small enterprises lost their jobs. It was also difficult to understand the reasons for saving some banks while others were left to fail. The actual global crisis revealed also the bank regulation failure which couldn't keep the pace with the financial institutions irresponsible behavior. One of the main goals of bank regulation is to ensure the banking sector solvability. However, many banks perceive these requirements as impediments to obtain high profits and try to elude them by financial innovations and even by fraudulent practices. In fact, these banks undermine the measures meant to protect them. Such irresponsible behavior is stimulated by the fact these banks are confident the government would rescue them in the case of substantial losses. In the last decades and especially from the beginning of the financial turmoil several attempts to reform the banking sector were made. Such initiatives include more restrictive bank regulation, the narrow banking implementation or even the main banks nationalization.
In this paper we approach the evolution of the Romanian SOBs in the last decades. During the communist regime Romania was a particular case among the CEE countries being considered, between 1964 and 1987, as the least obedient satellite of Soviet Union. From this position, the Romanian Communist Party, initiated, in the 1960s, a sort of economy liberalization but also strongly rejected the perestroika in the later 1980s. The banking system was highly controlled by the members of the former secret police some of them, managing to maintain their influence even after the fall of the communist regime. This influence has to be taken into consideration in any analysis of Romanian SOBs.
The rest of the paper is organized as it follows. The second part describes the Romanian banking system, the third part presents the evolutions of seven SOBs, the fourth part approaches the perspective of the last remaining two SOBs and the fifth part concludes. In the 1980s Romania, as many other developing countries, was affected by the foreign debt crisis. In these circumstances, the Romanian government adopted a radical strategy to pay back the whole foreign debt in less than ten years. Drastic measures to reduce the imports and to increase the exports were implemented. In these years, the economy liberalization was stopped. Instead, it was substantially increased the involvement of the Romanian secret police, called "Securitate", in the economic activity. Many banking operations were, in fact, controlled by "Securitate". The new legislation allowed for the creation of private banks, but the system of supervision was inconsistent. In these circumstances and since the big international private banks were reticent to establish subsidiaries in Romania, most of the private banks in the early 1990s were in fact organized with frauds purposes. Soon they became bankrupted and many deponents lost their money. This situation contributed to a substantial lack of trust regarding the private banks. In fact, in this period of time, substantial losses occurred also in SOBs because frauds or inefficient management, but the authorities avoided radical measures to solve this situation.
The Banking system in
In the late 1990s the change of the political regime and the pressures from international financial institutions led to substantial reforms in the Romanian banking system. NBR has tightened the supervision rules. The government had to accept the closing of the largest Romanian SOBs and it engaged to privatize other banks. The Government sold shares of four SOBs to foreign private banks. In the present, only two SOBs still activate in Romania.
Evolutions of the Romanian SOBs
In the early 1990s seven SOBs functioned in Romania: Bancorex, Banca Agricola, CEC Bank, Banca Comerciala Romana, Banca Romana de Dezvoltare, Bancpost and Exim Bank. Since then they experienced different ways: one of them was closed, four were privatized and two are still owned by the state. After December 1989, when the communist regime fell, some changes were operated in the bank top management, but its functional structure remained unchanged. In 1990, BRCE was transformed in Bancorex, a state-owned bank. In the early 1990s Bancorex was the largest bank of Romania and its employees enjoyed the reputation of being familiarized with capitalist business. It was also preferred by the government in financing the foreign trade. In fact, Bancorex was used as a tool for offering subsidies to the state enterprises in forms of loans which were never repaid.
Beside that, the political influence facilitated a massive corruption. As later enquires revealed, during 1990s several politicians and businessmen with political connections obtained from Bancorex substantial loans in very favorable conditions. By sophisticated transactions, the bank financed also political parties. Moreover, in order to obtain a kind of immunity for the eventual investigations, the Bancorex managers signed an agreement with Interior Ministry by which loans with very low interest rates were offered to Romanian policemen.
Over the years, such practices generated massive losses which became unbearable. In 1997, under the pressures of international financial institutions, the Romanian Government publicly admitted the dangerous situation and it announced a 600 million dollars aid meant to solve the problem of the nonperforming loans.
However, in the absence of a real restructuring of the bank management, this substantial amount proved not to be enough to save Bancorex.
In 1999, a new estimation indicated that the largest Romanian SOB needed another 2 billion dollars aid. Unable to provide this amount, which represented more than 5 percent of Romania's GDP, the government had to accept the closing of The former general manager of the bank was jailed for some years, but finally he was not found guilty by the Romanian justice. For the public opinion it was offered the explanation that Bancorex was sacrificed for the Romanian citizens that could buy, thanks to the bank operations, energy at low prices. Until now, the support provided by Exim Bank to Romanian exporters was criticized.
Banca Agricol -
There were also allegations that the very well paid managers of the bank were named on political criteria. It was found that some of them were officers of the former secret police.
Perspectives of the two remaining SOBs from Romania
In present only two Romanian banks are state-owned: Exim Bank and CEC Bank. The missions they have to fulfill make their situations quite different.
Since the adhesion to European Union, the necessity of redesign the Romanian foreign trade policy became obviously. In this context Exim Bank had to be reorganized, to be more closed to exporters and more efficient. Although the bank could remain state-owned it would be desirable the transparency in naming its leadership and even introducing a private management.
In the actual context of the global crisis the privatization of CEC Bank has to be postponed. Usually, during such critical conditions, the deponents trust more in SOBs than in the private banks so the announcement of the bank privatization could spread some worries among the clients. In fact, CEC Bank could play a major role in the efforts to reorganize the national banking system. Such a reform could have four main dimensions:
1. implementation of a state-owned payment and saving system; 2. establishment of state insurance system specialized in bank activities; 3. the ban, by law, of the government to bailout banks; 4. the gradually relaxation of the minim capital requirements for banks.
1. Implementation of a state-owned payment and saving system. A stateowned payment and saving system will offer an alternative to people and enterprises which want to eliminate the counterpart risk in such transactions. In order to bring stability to this system strict requirements have to be fulfilled. Only less than 75 percents of the collected funds could be lent and only to the central government. The interest rates for deposits will be established by the government taking into consideration the inflation forecasts. Anyway, these interest rates could be lower than those practiced by the banks since the involved risks are insignificant.
Establishment of state insurance system specialized in bank activities.
In the case of a big financial institution bankruptcy, a private insurance corporation could have some difficulties in fulfilling its obligations. Instead, a state owned insurance system would be more appropriate to deal with such a situation. The commercial banks will not be obliged to use the new insurance system but those will do will gain, probably, the customers trust. The insured banks have to respect strict requirements regarding their capitals and the risks taken in their operations. The indemnities will be granted only after rigorous analysis of the circumstances in which the losses occurred.
3. The ban, by law, of the government to bailout banks. In fact, after the state payments and the savings systems implementation and the new insurance system creation, the government will have no reason for such an intervention since the affected customers were aware of the risks taken when they chose to use the bank services instead of those provided by the state.
The gradually relaxation of the minim capital requirements for banks.
Since the government no longer bailout the financial institutions it is justified a relaxation of the bank regulation, especially the minim capital requirements.
However, this process will be implemented only gradually, in order to not disturb the monetary stability. In the new circumstances the banks will gain more freedom by the relaxation of regulation, but they have to learn to act responsibly in such a context. They and their customers should be aware they couldn't count on the government intervention in critical situations. It is possible that these changes to make many banks voluntarily adopt prudential norms for their operations.
In applying such a reform CEC Bank could be easily transformed in a stateowned payment and saving system. In order to avoid political interferences it will be desirable that the new institution to be subordinate not to the Government but to the central bank.
Conclusions
In this paper we approached the changes experienced by the state-owned banks from Romania during and after the communist regime.
One of them had to be closed and other two passed critical situations mainly because of the political interferences that facilitated fraudulent practices. In that transition period, the SOBs privatization was viewed as the most adequate solution to heal the Romanian banking system. Four SOBs were bought by foreign private banks which provided the capitals and experience needed for surviving in the increasing competitive environment. The experience of Banca Agricol , which was near bankruptcy in 2000 and became profitable in short time after the privatization it is an obvious proof about the private management advantages.
However, the critical situation of the three SOBs in the 1990s does not mean that state ownership of the banks has to be always associated with inefficiency and corruption. During transition, when the supervising system of banking activities was very relaxed, many Romanian private banks also collapsed. In that turbulent period the state institutions were weak and unable to fight against corruption. In fact, any analysis of the economic processes occurred in the 1990s in Romania and in other CEE countries has to take into consideration the influence of the former secret police and the groups of interests inherited from the communist regime.
The future of the two remaining SOBs is very difficult to anticipate. In the case of Exim Bank, the existence of a SOB that finances the exports is a controversy not only in Romania but also in the United States. Anyway, it is indicated a rethinking of Exim Bank strategy. In the case of CEC Bank, the privatization should be postponed at least after the end of the actual global crisis. Meanwhile, CEC Bank could be transformed in a state-owned payment and savings system.
